

Message Text

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ACTION IO-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-06 EUR-12 EA-06 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0676

INFO AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY MONROVIA

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMCONGEN CAPETOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 1962

CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UN, SC, WA

SUBJ: NAMIBIA IN SECURITY COUNCIL

REF: USUN 1957 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: CHINESE, SWEDISH AND TANZANIAN ROLES WERE KEY FACTORS
IN SC FAILURE TO TAKE CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION IN NAMIBIA
DEBATE, WHICH ENDED WITH TRIPARTITE VETO OF RESOLUTION
CALLING FOR ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. END SUMMARY.

1. IN POINT OF TIME, FIRST CAUSE OF AFRICAN GROUP'S ULTIMATE
DECISION TO TABLE RESOLUTION SURE TO BE VETOED WAS SWEDEN'S EARLY
ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUPPORT OF MANDATORY SANCTIONS. AFRICANS WERE
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THUS VIRTUALLY ASSURED OF NINE YES VOTES FOR CHAPTER VII

ARMS EMBARGO EVEN IF COSTA RICA, JAPAN AND ITALY ALL ABSTAINED. (IN ACTUAL EVENT, COSTA RICA ALSO VOTED YES.) THUS HARD LINE AFRICANS COULD ARGUE THAT TOUGH RESOLUTION THAT WOULD BE ADOPTED, EXCEPT FOR WESTERN VETOS, WOULD CONSTITUTE MORAL VICTORY.

2. WHILE AFRICANS WERE WELL AWARE THAT SWEDISH SUPPORT FOR ARMS EMBARGO WAS CYNICALLY INTENDED TO DIVERT SC FROM POSSIBLE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS THAT WOULD BE COSTLY TO SWEDISH COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, THEY WERE VOCALLY GRATEFUL FOR SWEDISH POSITION.

3. AS EARLY AS JUNE 4, KEY AF DELEGATIONS WERE FULLY AWARE OF STRONG CHINESE OPPOSITION TO CONTACT GROUP ALONG LINES SUGGESTED BY FRENCH. BY THE FOLLOWING DAY, CHINESE, BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON TANZANIAN FOMIN MALECELA, WERE APPLYING STRATEGY OF SEEKING HARD RESOLUTION THAT WOULD BE VETOED. CHINESE WERE PRESUMED TO BE FEARFUL THAT INCLUSION IN CONTACT GROUP OF REPRESENTATIVE OF SYG WOULD PLAY INTO HANDS OF SOVIETS IN SECRETARIAT. PRC DELEGATION IS KNOWN TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT ITS WEAKNESS IN SECRETARIAT POWER STRUCTURE, AND TO BE INTENSELY JEALOUS OF POWER WIELDED BY USSR'S SHEVCHENKO, USYG FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS. WHEN NEGATIVE OUTCOME OF NAMIBIA DEBATE ASSURED, CHINESE DID NOT HIDE THEIR SATISFACTION AT "PUTTING DOWN" THE SOVIETS.

4. THERE WERE SEVERAL "IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN" FACTORS THAT MIGHT HAVE PRODUCED CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME. SOVIETS, WHO AT END OF DEBATE SEEMED AWARE THAT CHINA HAD STOLEN MARCH, PLAYED RELATIVELY PASSIVE ROLE. DURING CRITICAL PHASES OF DEBATE, BOTH PERM REP MALIK AND MINISTER OVINNIKOV WERE ABSENT, WHILE THEIR SUBSTANTIVE EXPERTS ENGAGED INTER ALIA IN US-BAITING IN TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL. HAD TANZANIA'S MALECELA NOT BEEN IN NEW YORK, TANZANIAN PERM REP SALIM MIGHT HAVE BEEN LESS SUSCEPTIBLE THAN HIS CHIEF TO CHINESE INFLUENCE. ABLE, PRAGMATIC SALIM PROFESSED TO FAVOR MODERATE RESOLUTION AND MADE NOTABLY MODERATE SUMMATION SPEECH AT END OF DEBATE AFTER MALECELA'S DEPARTURE. NEAR END OF DEBATE, ABSENCE OF ZAMBIAN LEADERS MWAANGA AND BANDA

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LEFT OAU REP OUATTARA AS ONLY STRONG AFRICAN VOICE PRESSING FOR MODERATE RESOLUTION. ZAMBIAN CHARGE ZIMBA WAS COMPLETELY OUT OF GAME. IN ABSENCE ZAMBIAN LEADERS, SWAPO REP NUJOMA REVERTED TO HARD LINE AND ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH MALECELA.

5. IT IS REGRETTABLE THAT DEBATE IN WHICH AFRICANS WERE SHOWING STRONG SENSE OF REALISM AND PRAGMATISM ENDED UN-

CONSTRUCTIVELY AS RESULT OF SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY. ONE OF
CRITICAL DETERMINANTS OF THIS OUTCOME WAS THAT EVEN SUCH
MODERATES AS LIBERIAN FONMIN DENNIS, IN LATTER PHASES OF
DEBATE, ASSOCIATED THEMSELVES WITH MALECELA. IT IS IRONIC
THAT MALECELA, THOUGH CLOSELY ATTUNED TO CHINESE
INTERESTS, WAS PROJECTED AS CHAMPION OF MILITANT AFRICANISM.
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